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Abstract
This paper examines climate-change benet-cost analysis in the presence of scientic uncertainty
in the form of ambiguity. The specic issue addressed is the robustness of benet-cost analyses of
climate-change policy alternatives to relaxation of Savages original axioms. Two alternatives to
subjective expected utility (SEU) are considered: maximin expected utility (MEU) and incomplete
expected utility (IEU). Among other results, it is demonstrated that polar opposite recommen-
dations can emerge in an ambiguous decision setting even if all agree on Societys rate of time
preference, Societys risk attitudes, the degree of ambiguity faced, and the scientic primitives. We
show that, for a simple numerical simulation of our model, an MEU decision maker favors policies
which immediately tackle climate change while an IEU decision prefers business as usual.
Each agency shall assess the costs and benets of the intended regulation, and recogniz-
ing that some costs and benets are di¢ cult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the benets of the intended regulation justify
its cost.Executive Order 12866 of the US President
1 Introduction
This paper studies the meaning of a reasoned determination that the benets of the intended regu-
lation justify its cost in an uncertain (ambiguous) setting. The specic focus is on climate change.
The highly imprecise nature of existing climate-science knowledge, the potential for fundamental but
unknown irreversibilities in physical systems, the long-time lags involved, and the unpredictability of
technological adaptation all ensure that probabilistic assessments for climate change are inherently
subjective. Not only are probabilistic assessments subjective, they are widely disparate.
In its Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
reported no fewer than 18 climate-sensitivity probability distributions while noting no well-established
formal way of estimating a single PDFexists ( IPCC 2007, Box 10.2, Figures 1 and 2). Six years
on, the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report reported that there does not exist at present a single agreed
on and robust formal methodology to deliver uncertainty quantication estimates of future changes
in all climate variables (IPCC AR5, 2013, p. 1040). This ambiguity is especially pronounced
for large global-temperature increases. Current knowledge is not data-based and relies instead on
extrapolations from models for which many key components of climate-change processes are poorly
understood. Many factors, including data limitations and poor understanding of geophysical re-
sponses, contribute to this ambiguity.1
Economists have responded to this widespread ambiguity by conducting benet-cost analyses
of climate-policy alternatives in a subjective-expected-utility (SEU) framework. The behavioral
axioms underlying the SEU model have been widely criticized. And these criticisms have spawned
an array of alternatives, many of which were developed expressly to accommodate known shortcom-
ings of SEU theory in an ambiguous setting. A fundamental observation motivating this criticism
is that oftentimes, when an objective probability distribution is not available, observed decision
behavior contradicts both objective and subjective EU theory and, more generally, probabilistic
sophistication (Machina and Schmeidler, 1992). The widespread ignorance and scientic uncer-
tainty surrounding climate change ensure that current policy makers face an ambiguous decision
situation not unlike betting on Ellsberg urns. The stakes, however, are immeasurably higher than
in Ellsbergs (1961) thought experiments.
1IPCC (2007) Chapters 8 through 10 contain a particularly informative and detailed discussions concerning the
causes and the presence of scientic uncertainty.
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One alternative to accommodate behavioral sensitivity to ambiguity is to relax or alter Savages
sure-thing principle. The most popular models taking this approach include maximin expected
utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989), and the smooth
ambiguity model (Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005). Another alternative is to relax Savages
completeness axiom (Aumann 1962, Bewley 1986). Von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), Au-
mann (1962), Bewley (1986), Schmeidler (1989), and more recently Galaabaatar and Karni (2013),
all have questioned both its realism and its normative content. Aumann (1962, p. 446) wrote that
[o]f all the axioms of utility theory, the completeness axiom is perhaps the most questionable.
Like others of the axioms, it is inaccurate as a description of real life; but unlike them, we nd it
hard to accept even from a normative viewpoint.Much earlier, von-Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947) had recognized that ... it may even in a way be more realistic...to allow for cases where
the individual is neither able to state which of two alternatives he prefers nor that they are equally
desirable. Even Savage (1954) expressed ambivalence about the completeness axiom: There is
some temptation to explore the possibilities of analyzing preference among acts as a partial or-
dering,..., admitting that some pairs of acts are incomparable. This would seem to give expression
to introspective sensations of indecision or vacillation, which we may be reluctant to identify with
indi¤erence.(emphasis in original)
This paper asks: What are the practical consequences for making a reasoned determination
about the benets and costs of alternative climate policies of considering alternatives to Savages
(1954) normative framework? The maximin expected utility (MEU) model (Gilboa and Schmeidler
1989) and the incomplete expected utility (IEU) model (Bewley 1986) are considered as exemplars.
Both are early alternatives to SEU. Both o¤er the SEU model as an in-betweencase. And both
represent complementary approaches to making decisions. Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Schmeidler (2010) have shown that MEU is a subjectively rational framework for making decisions
and that IEU is an objectively rational framework. Subjectively rational requires making choices that
others cannot convince a decision maker are wrong. Objectively rational requires making choices
that a decision maker can convince others are correct.
The practical consequence of considering alternative normative frameworks is that polar opposite
recommendations emerge from these alternatives even if all agree on Societys rate of time preference,
Societys risk attitudes, the degree of ambiguity faced, and on the scientic primitives. IEU
decision makers are more conservative than SEU or MEU decision makers in adopting policies
to ameliorate climate change, while MEU decision makers are more progressive in adopting such
policies. Consequently, an empirical chasm typically exists between the subjectively rational MEU
alternative and its objectively rational IEU alternative. And so, where existing SEU analyses have
narrowly focused debate on the two parameters of the constant relative risk-averse utility structure,
the di¤erences that emerge by di¤erent parametric choices are dwarfed by di¤erences that emerge
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from using di¤erent normative alternatives. Simply put, the results from SEU benet-cost analyses
of climate-change policies lack normative robustness.
Making this point requires a formal framework. The model developed is intended to be as sim-
ple as possible while still preserving the uncertain, dynamic, and general-equilibrium nature of the
decision environment. Our study is not the rst to examine climate-change alternatives using non-
expected utility preferences. A growing literature exists on incorporating ambiguity into economic
analysis of climate change. Lange and Treich (2008), Millner et al. (2013) and Traeger (2014)
use Klibano¤ et al.s (2005) smooth ambiguity model to evaluate alternative policies. Lange and
Treich (2008) construct examples where increasing ambiguity aversion leads to a more stringent
environmental policy and to where it has an ambiguous e¤ect. Millner et al. (2013) characterize
conditions under which optimal abatement increases with ambiguity aversion. The same authors
also combine their preference model with the DICE integrated assessment model (Nordhaus, 2008)
to investigate how ambiguity about climate sensitivity a¤ects welfare analysis. Traeger (2014) estab-
lishes a relationship between the dynamic smooth ambiguity model and the model of intertemporal
risk aversion. He also derives the stochastic social discount rate for various specications of the
intertemporal model. Asano (2010) deviates from the smooth ambiguity framework by developing
a dynamic maximin expected utility model. He demonstrates that an increase in ambiguity brings
forward the adoption of the optimal environmental policy.
In what follows, we rst introduce the model. To crystallize the argument, a stylized world
is assumed in which there exists common agreement on many hotly contested items. And so,
we rst introduce things on which we choose to pretend all agree. These include the physical
technology for transferring consumption possibilities from one period to the next, the existing
degree of ambiguity, Societys rate of time preference, and Societys risk attitudes. Then we turn to
things on which there is potential disagreement. That disagreement is restricted to which rationality
axioms to impose upon Societys decision makers. Three alternative sets, each resulting in a specic
benet-cost criterion, are presented. First, the di¤erences are analyzed conceptually and then a
quantitative analysis that relies heavily on previously-used parametrization is presented. The nal
section discusses the implications of the results.
2 The model
Much, if not most, existing economic climate-change analyses are in integrated-assessment model
(IAM) form. Pioneered by Nordhaus (1991, 1993), these models integrate climate-science models
with economic models of how climate change a¤ects important economic variables. By their very
essence, they are simultaneously complicated and deeply simplied. They are complicated because
they integrate so many components into a common structure. They are simplied because they rely
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on tractably convenient assumptions about physical interrelationships, technological interactions,
and economic behavior. Core contributions, in addition to Nordhaus (1991, 1993), include Stern
(2007), Nordhaus (2008), and the United States Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of
Carbon (USIWGSCC) (2010). Pindyck (2013) presents a deeply critical review of the overall IAM
e¤ort.
We take another tack. We aim for simplicity to ensure that the origin of our results is transparent
and can be grasped without detailed knowledge of existing IAM models. Although formalized in
a very di¤erent way, what follows is more closely related to Weitzman (2007, 2009) and Pindyck
(2012) which marry basic concepts from Ramsey-type growth theory with benet-cost analyses in
an SEU framework.
2.1 Commonly agreed ingredients
There are two periods and a single decision maker. The current period, 0; is nonstochastic but the
future period, period 1; is uncertain. The decision makers problem is how to allocate her current
period wealth, w; between current period consumption, c0 2 R+, and investments to generate con-
sumption in period 1: Uncertainty is represented by a nite set of states 
 = f1; 2; :::; Sg : A natural
intuitive interpretation of 
 is as cataloguing the range of possibilities for a key environmental
variable such as the climate-sensitivity parameter2 that is a crucial component of many IAMs. But
we emphasize the intuitivenature of the interpretation because 
 can accommodate more general
and realistic decision scenarios. X  RS denotes the set of constant acts (elements of RS taking
the same value in each state), and x 2 X denotes the constant act taking the same real value, x, in
each state of Nature.
There exists scientic uncertaintyso that there is no common agreement upon a single prob-
ability measure to associate with 
: Rather, the beliefs about 
 are characterized by a nonempty,
nonsingleton, closed convex set  which is a subset of the probability simplex   RS+: Scientic
uncertainty in the form of ambiguity is a core assumption of our model. Although it is not frequently
maintained, it is realistic given the broadly divergent scientic ndings regarding the likelihood of
the degree of climate change and the associated welfare implications (IPCC 2007, 2013, and Heal
and Millner, 2014, 2015).3
2Climate sensivity is usually expressed as the equilibrium change in the temperature from pre-industrial times
that would eventually materialize if the atmposhperic CO2 concentration were to double.
3Roe and Baker (2007) observe that uncertainty in climate projections is very signicant and that it has not
narrowed appreciably over past 30 years(p. 629). Allen and Frame (2007) go even further and argue that climate
sensitivity may be unknowable.Similarly, Pindyck (2013) writes that ...the physical mechanisms that determine
climate sensitivity involve crucial feedback loops, and the parameter values that determine the strength (and even
the sign) of those feedback loops are largely unknown, and for the foreseeable future may even be unknowable.
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To model the (stochastic) consumption possibilities available for period 1, we borrow methods
originally developed in the literatures on activity analysis, general equilibrium under uncertainty,
and nance under uncertainty (Koopmans 1951, Debreu 1959, LeRoy and Werner 2001). Speci-
cally, we assume that consumption in period 1 is achieved by diverting period 0 initial wealth, w;
towards a stochastic production process. Thus, we view that diverted wealth as an input to that
process that one can generically conceptualize as e¤ort. That stochastic production process, which
gives rise to period 1 consumption possibilities, involves allocating that period 0 e¤ort across J
distinct linear stochastic production activities.
To be specic, the stochastic period 1 output generated by operating the jth production activity
with one unit of e¤ort is Aj 2 RS+; j = 1; 2; :::; J:4 If the decision maker allocates hj 2 R+ units
of period 0 e¤ort to the jth activity, the linearity of the production activity generates a period 1
stochastic consumption stream of Ajhj 2 RS+: Thus, the stochastic period 1 consumption available
from devoting
PJ
j=1 h
j 2 R+ in period 0 to the J di¤erent production activities is
c1 =
JX
j=1
Ajh
j 2 RS+;
or in matrix notation
c1 = Ah;
where A = [A1; A2; :::; AJ ] and h =

h1; :::; hJ
>
:5
2.2 Axiomatic alternatives
The decision-makers preferences are dened over the two-period consumption stream (c0; c1) 2
R+RS. Three di¤erent decision paradigms are considered. Each is rationalized by a binary relation
dened on R+  RS and denoted by  where (y0; y1)  (q0; q1) is to be read as (y0; y1) is strictly
preferred to (q0; q1) : Each binary relation is strictly increasing in the sense that (y0; y1)  (q0; q1) 2
The uncertainty surrounding the e¤ect of climate change on various environmental and economic indicators is even
greater than that pertaining to climate sensitivity. Nordhaus (2010) suggests that understanding the market and
nonmarket impacts of climate change continues to be the thorniest issue in climate-change economics(p. 11722).
4For example, USIWGSCC considered ve such trajectories in formulating its conclusions (USIWGSCC, 2010;
Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton, 2013). Alternatively, one might think of each Aj intuitively as being the
stochastic consumption trajectory consistent with a particular emissions pathway such as those given by the four
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) utilized in the IPCC AR5. But this should be done cautiously be-
cause the identication between the two is incomplete. The RCPs are internally consistent sets of forcing projections
to be used in alternative climate-change models. Multiple socioeconomic scenarios can be consistent with a single
RCP (Collins et al., 2013), and multiple RCPs can be consistent with a single socioeconomic scenario. So while there
are 4 RCPs in AR5, a prior i, there is no reason to restrict the column dimension of A to be 4 or smaller.
5All vectors in the paper without a transpose sign >are in column form.
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R1+S+ n f0g =) (y0; y1)  (q0; q1) : By this monotonicity assumption, it follows that the decision
maker always combines production activities to ensure that period 1 stochastic consumption is
nanced at minimal period 0 cost. The period 0 minimal cost of assembling a period 1 stochastic
consumption of c1 2 RS+ from the J production activities is given by the function m : RS+ ! R+
dened as
m
 
c1
  min
h2RJ+

1>h : Ah  c1	
= max
p2RS

p>c1 : p>A  1>	 ;
if there exists h such that Ah  c1 and1 otherwise. Here 1> denotes the J dimensional row vector
with ones in each entry. Thus, economically e¢ cient (that is, consistent with minimal period 0
cost) consumption possibilities associated with a period 0 expenditure of (w   c0) are given by
C
 
w   c0 = c1 :  w   c0  m  c1	 :
The fundamental distinction between the three paradigms lies in how each augments or alters a
common set of axioms, maintained throughout the paper. The common axioms require that  be
irreexive, transitive, continuous, monotonic, and risk averse.
The benchmark is the SEU model. It augments the common axioms by requiring that 
completely orders R+  RS and satises Savages sure-thing principle (independence). The two
alternatives are the IEU model (Aumann 1962; Bewley 1986), and Gilboa and Schmeidlers (1989)
MEU model. IEU augments the common axioms by imposing Savages sure-thing principle, but it
does not require that  completely order R+RS: MEU maintains complete ordering but relaxes
independence to certainty independence. Roughly speaking, certainty independence requires that
mixing gambles with degenerate gambles (that is, gambles x 2 X) preserves the preference ordering.
The specic functional forms were chosen to satisfy two criteria: rst, to simplify comparisons
across paradigms; and second, to simplify comparisons with existing SEU based analyses of climate
change. A decision maker with SEU preferences, denoted SEU ; ranks alternative consumption
bundles as:
 
c0; c1
 SEU  c00; c10() u  c0+ SX
s=1
^su
 
c1s

> u
 
c00

+
SX
s=1
^su
 
c10s

;
where ^  (^1; :::; ^S) 2  is a subjective probability distribution over 
 and  measures the rate of
time preference. In our formulation,  is the reverse of the discount factor. It is commonly assumed
that  > 1 so that more weight is placed on the present, period-0 consumption, than on the future,
period-1 consumption. We maintain this assumption in the numerical part of the paper. However,
none of the theoretical ndings hinges on this assumption. We assume that u () is strictly concave
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and that it satises the standard Inada conditions.6 An MEU decision maker, denoted MEU ,
ranks consumption according to
 
c0; c1
 MEU  c00; c10() u  c0+ min
2
(
SX
s=1
su
 
c1s
)
> u
 
c00

+ min
2
(
SX
s=1
su
 
c10s
)
;
and the decision maker has IEU preferences IEU if:
 
c0; c1
 IEU  c00; c10() u  c0+ SX
s=1
su
 
c1s

> u
 
c00

+
SX
s=1
su
 
c10s

for all  2 :
In contrast to an SEU decision maker, both anMEU and an IEU decision makers have beliefs
given by a set of probability distributions. However, the ways the latter two decision makers
utilize their beliefs to compare di¤erent consumption streams stand in sharp contrast. An MEU
decision maker evaluates each consumption stream using the probability distribution that yields the
lowest expected utlity among all probability distributions from the set : Thus, an MEU decision
maker exhibits complete pessimism for each consumption stream. In contrast, an IEU decision
maker strictly prefers one consumption stream to another only if the former yields a strictly higher
expected utility for all probability distributions in the set : Such unanimity favors the status quo
consumption stream and it can be interpreted as optimism toward that status quo.
Given our desire to have the di¤erent decision makers agree as much as possible, our assumption
that beliefs ^ of an SEU decision maker belong to set  is natural. Because  is convex, any ^
in its relative interior is a convex combination of other elements of : Hence, ^ can be derived via
Bayesian calculation, where a prior over  is used to calculate an expectedprobability measure.
Thus, this specication accommodates Weitzmans (2007, 2009) Bayesian-updating-induced tail
fattening. Throughout the remainder of the paper, , u; and  are assumed common across
paradigms. Gilboa et al. (2010) show that commonality of , u; and  across the MEU and
IEU paradigms emerges from requiring consistency between objectively rational and subjectively
rational choices and caution. Consistency requires that anything that is objectively rational must
6Assuming u is strictly concave and satises the standard Inada conditions
lim
c!0
u0 (c) =1; lim
c!1u
0 (c) = 0;
opens the door, with a nite state space and positive probability measures, for the Dismal Theoremof Weitzman
(2009). The consequences of the Dismal Theorem have been debated in a number of fora including Nordhaus (2011),
Pindyck (2011), Weitzman (2011), and Millner (2013). Weitzman (2009, 2011) and Pindyck (2011) have argued for
the introduction of a value of statistic life (VSL)-type parameter in SEU cost-benet calculations as a device for
closing the model in making practical policy evaluations when the CRRA specication is used in an SEU criterion
function. Our model can certainly replicate the Dismal Theorem, but because our concern lies elsewhere, we avoid
closing the modelin this fashion.
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also be subjectively rational. Caution requires that an uncertain act is preferred to a constant act
only if it is never objectively rational to prefer the constant act.
MEU and IEU preferences have kinked indi¤erence curves. In contrast, SEU indi¤erence
curves are smooth and tangent to the fair-odds line dened by ^ in the neighborhood of X. Figure
1 illustrates in the space of period 1 consumption vectors. There, 
 = f1; 2g. Consumption in
state 1 is measured on the horizontal axis and consumption in state 2 on the vertical axis. The set
X  R2 consists of the points on the 45o degree line (the bisector) passing through the origin on
which c1 = c2 for every point. For visual clarity, these indi¤erence curves are drawn for risk-neutral
(that is, u linear) preferences. The SEU indi¤erence curve is the straight line passing through B,
U , and G. The IEU indi¤erence curve, when the initial allocation of period 1 consumption is at
U; is the kinked line passing through A, U , and E. Finally, the kinked indi¤erence curve for MEU
preferences passes through points A, U , D, and F . The key di¤erence between MEU and IEU
preferences is that the indi¤erence curves for the former are only kinked in the neighborhood of D:
MEU and IEU preferences reect two di¤erent types of conservative behavior. MEU pref-
erences, being kinked in the neighborhood of riskless outcomes (point D in Figure 1), reect con-
servatism in moving away from the riskless outcome. They have been o¤ered, for example, as an
explanation for individuals fully insuring outcomes at actuarially unfair odds. Away from the risk-
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less outcome, alternatives are always evaluated, relative to the riskless outcome, in terms of the
worst possible odds.
IEU preferences, on the other hand, are kinked at the current consumption point, which can
occur anywhere. They, too, reect conservative behavior, but of the-devil-you-knowvariety, and
have been used to explain the status-quo bias and individuals refusing to trade or failing to mutually
insure.
2.3 Cardinalizing preferences
Benet-cost analysis requires a cardinal representation of the underlying social preference structure.
Because IEU preferences are not complete, cardinalization is slightly complicated because they
cannot be represented by a real-valued welfare functionthat ranks consumption bundles (c0; c1),
W : R+  RS ! R; such that W (c0; c1) > W (c00; c10) () (c0; c1) IEU (c00; c10) : Thus, a more
primitivefunctional representation of preferences is needed. Our specic choice is a willingness
to pay measure dened in terms of period 0 consumption. Dene T : RS  RS ! R by:
T (q; y) = sup

 2 R :  q0   ; q1   y0; y1	 ;
if there exists  2 R such that (q0   ; q1)  (y0; y1) and  1 otherwise, where q  (q0; q1)
and y  (y0; y1) : T (q; y) gives the largest decrease in period-0 consumption q0 consistent with
maintaining (q0   ; q1) strictly preferred to (y0; y1) and, thus measures the willingness to pay,
from a starting point of y; to make the move q   y:
For any  satisfying q  y =) q + RSn f0g  y; T (q; y) satises T (y; y) = 0: It is also a
complete functional representation of  in that
T (q; y) > 0() q  y; (1)
so that knowledge of T is equivalent to knowledge of  : If one is willing to pay a positive amount
to make the move q   y; q must be preferred to y: For SEU preferences:
TSEU (q; y) = sup
(
 : u
 
q0   + SX
s=1
^su
 
q1s

> u
 
y0

+
SX
s=1
^su
 
y1s
)
(2)
= q0   u 1
"
u
 
y0
  1

SX
s=1
^s
 
u
 
q1s
  u  y1s
#
;
for MEU preferences
TMEU (q; y) = sup
(
 : u
 
q0   + min
2
(
SX
s=1
su
 
q1s
)
> u
 
y0

+ min
2
(
SX
s=1
su
 
y1s
))
(3)
= q0   u 1
"
u
 
y0
  1

 
min
2
(
SX
s=1
su
 
q1s
) min
2
(
SX
s=1
su
 
y1s
)!#
;
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and for IEU preferences
T
IEU
(q; y) = sup
(
 : u
 
q0   + SX
s=1
su
 
q1s

> u
 
y0

+
SX
s=1
su
 
y1s

for all  2 
)
(4)
= q0  
 
u 1
"
u
 
y0
  1

min
2
SX
s=1
s
 
u
 
q1s
  u  y1s
#!
:
Our choice of T (q; y) as the device for cardinalizing preferences is to some extent arbitrary.
While T (q; y) is a function representation of ; it is not the only such possible measure. For
example, Pindyck (2012) uses the willingness to pay denition, in our notation,
sup

 > 0 :
 
(1  ) q0; (1  ) q1   y0; y1	
that corresponds to the percentage of q one would be willing to pay to forego the movement y   q:
It, too, is a complete function representation of  : Thus, qualitative results obtained using either
measure will be equivalent.
3 Benet-cost analyses of alternative policies
Suppose that the decision maker initially is at (y0; y1) with y0 = w  m (y1) and is considering the
alternative (q0; q1) with q0 = w  m (q1) : The criterion for adopting (w  m (q1) ; q1) requires 
w  m  q1 ; q1   w  m  y1 ; y1 ;
or equivalently
T
  
w  m  q1 ; q1 ;  w  m  y1 ; y1 > 0:
Recalling that T (y; y) = 0; this requires that
T
  
w  m  q1 ; q1 ;  w  m  y1 ; y1  T   w  m  y1 ; y1 ;  w  m  y1 ; y1 > 0;
which for marginal changes, converts to the (one-sided) directional derivative7 of T (; ) evaluated
at (y; y) in the direction (m (y1) m (q1) ; q1   y1) :
T o
 
y; y;m
 
y1
 m  q1 ; q1   y1 = lim
#0
24 T(w m(y1)+(m(y1) m(q1));y1+(q1 y1);w m(y1);y1)
 T(w m(y
1);y1;w m(y1);y1)

35 > 0:
(5)
7The (one-sided) directional derivative of T (d; f) evaluated at (d; f) 2 RS+1 RS+1 in the direction n 2 RS+1 is
given by
T o (d; f ; g) = lim
#0
T (d+ g; f)  T (d; f)

:
The use of one-sided directional derivatives in making this and other marginal arguments is necessitated by the non-
smooth character of the preference maps associated with IEU and MEU preferences. This nonsmoothness, which has
often been associated with market inertia, is fundamental to how these decisionmakers respond to ambiguity.
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We proceed in stages. First, we derive the general result that IEU preferences have the most
conservative (most di¢ cult to satisfy) criterion for adoption. Then, to sharpen the analysis and to
set the stage for our numerical analysis, we treat the case where 
 = fB;Gg for badand good,
respectively.
3.1 The general case
We demonstrate in the Appendix that
T oSEU
 
y; y;m
 
y1
 m  q1 ; q1   y1 = Ps ^su0 (y1s) (q1s   y1s)
u0 (w  m (y1)) +
 
m
 
y1
 m  q1 ; (6)
T oMEU
 
y; y;m
 
y1
 m  q1 ; q1   y1 = min2MEU (y) f
P
s su
0 (y1s) (q
1
s   y1s)g
u0 (w  m (y1)) +
 
m
 
y1
 m  q1 ;
T oIEU
 
y; y;m
 
y1
 m  q1 ; q1   y1 = min2 f
P
s su
0 (y1s) (q
1
s   y1s)g
u0 (w  m (y1)) +
 
m
 
y1
 m  q1 ;
where MEU (y) = arg min
2
nPS
s=1 su (y
1
s)
o
:
The intuition behind each adoption criterion is the same. Just as an investor should be will-
ing to incorporate into his or her portfolio assets whose stochastically discounted return exceeds
their acquisition cost (a familiar martingale pricing principle), alternative q should be adopted if
its stochastically discounted marginal return exceeds its marginal cost. The di¤erences between
the adoption criteria lie in the probability measure associated with the stochastic discount fac-
tor,
u0(y1)
u0(w m(y1)) 2 RS. IEU chooses that measure pessimistically (relative to staying put). MEU
chooses it optimistically (relative to staying put). SEU falls somewhere in between. More formally,
it follows from (5) and (6) that
Proposition 1 A policy (w  m (q1) ; q1) is adopted under IEU only if it is adopted under both
SEU and MEU:
Figure 1 illustrates our result. The initial allocation y1 is given by the point U . To focus attention
on uncertain outcomes, suppose for the purposes of illustration that both the initial and alternative
allocations are equally costly, m (q1) = m (y1). Starting at y, a policy alternative represented by
the point H will be accepted by the individual with MEU preferences but not by a decision maker
with either SEU preferences or IEU preferences. Similarly, policy alternative I will be accepted
by both MEU and SEU but not by an IEU decision maker.8
The reason that this occurs is that the MEU decision maker judges gambles such as H using
the least-favorable odds for state 2 which now represents the good state of Nature because H
8Note that all three allocations, U; H, and I, involve some exposure to uncertainty.
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returns a higher consumption in that state than in state 1: The SEU decision maker, on the other
hand, judges policy H by a less pessimistic set of odds for state 2: Consequently, for that decision
maker, H does not represent an attractive alternative relative to U; and it will not be adopted. The
IEU decision maker also does not adopt H because her conservative behavior requires that H be
attractive for both the most favorable and the least favorable odds for state 2: And so, H is rejected
in favor of staying at U: The reasoning why policy alternative I is preferred to the initial allocation
U by both MEU and SEU but not by an IEU decision maker is similar.
By recycling Figure 1; one easily sees that similar behavior will be exhibited in cases where the
initial policy falls below X so that 1 instead of 2 is now the good state. The behavioral reason
behind such decisions is encapsulated in the probability measures that support each initial point.
For the IEU decision maker, the set of supporting probability measures is always ; while for
the SEU decision maker it is always the singleton set f^g 2 : Thus, while an SEU decision
maker may accept an alternative using ^; there is no guarantee that both the least favorable and
most favorable odds will judge the alternative as acceptable. Similarly, the MEU decision makers
supporting probabilities are characterized by the set MEU (y)  : Sometimes, for example if the
initial position involves no uncertainty, MEU (y) = ; both an MEU and IEU decision makers
conservatism will lead them to act identically. But more generally, the MEU decision makers
conservatism is more X primordial in the sense that it always harkens back to those riskless acts
as its ultimate goal. Thus, the MEU decision maker is willing to adopt alternatives that move
towards that goal that an IEU decision maker, who simply hesitates to move, will shun. Generally,
one cannot predict the relative behavior of SEU andMEU decision makers without prior knowledge
of the initial position. For example, if the initial position is somewhere inX; alternatives exist which
an SEU decision maker will adopt, but which an MEU decision maker will not. However, away
from X just the opposite pattern may occur as Figure 1 illustrates.
3.2 Two-state example
There are two states 
 = fB;Gg ; and the range of beliefs is given by
 =

(B; G) : B 2

L; H
  [0; 1]	
with ^B 2

L; H

: There are two consumption pathways: One, referred to as business-as-usual,
is denoted by subscript u; and the other is a climate-responsive pathway, denoted by c: More
formally,
A 
"
ABu ABc
AGu AGc
#
 [Au; Ac] ;
with
AGu > AGc > ABc > ABu: (7)
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Expression (7) requires that Ac attenuates the dispersion of consumption outcomes associated with
Au. If G occurs Ac sacrices some consumption, which is balanced against a consumption gain if
B occurs. Neither Au nor Ac dominates the other, both are technically e¢ cient, in the sense of
Koopmans (1951): In the present context, (7) guarantees the existence of a positive solution to9
p>A = 1>:
These consumption pathways are illustrated in Figure 2. There the vertical axis measures
outcomes in state G; mnemonically one can think of it as good in terms of climate outcomes and
the horizontal axis measures outcomes in state B; mnemonically this is the bad state. The 45o
degree line passing through the origin and labelled X represents the set of constant acts.
The two vectors labelled U and C represent the two consumption pathways. Each pathway repre-
sents consumption possibilities in states B and G associated with one unit of foregone consumption
in period 0: The pathway labeled U involves a relatively high consumption if the good climate state
9In a nancial context, (7) rules out the presence of arbitrages (Ross 1976). Direct calculation reveals
p> =

AGc  AGu
ABuAGc  ABcAGu ;
ABu  ABc
ABuAGc  ABcAGu

> 0:
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eventuates but low consumption otherwise. Intuitively, this is a business-as-usual practice that does
relatively little to prepare for the potential e¤ects of climate change. The pathway labeled C on
the other hand rotates away from pathway U towards X. In intuitive terms, it is less uncertain
than U: It manifests a technology that, compared to U; sacrices G state consumption in return for
higher B state consumption.
Restriction (7) ensures that neither of the two pathways dominates the other in both states.
This is reected in their relative lengths. One can envision a situation where U (C) was radially
extended enough so that it dominated C (U) in both B and G: If that radially extended U (C)
could be had for one unit of period 0 consumption, it would render C (U) redundant.
Normalizing period 0 expenditures on period 1 consumption to one, the range of period 1
feasible consumption choices is given by the points dominated by the convex combinations of U
and C; the shaded trapezoid 0AGuUCABc in Figure 2. The resulting range of choices mimics what
one would obtain from a piecewise linear transformation curve that transforms consumption
in state G into state B consumption. This, of course, reects our models ultimate roots in the
general-equilibrium analysis of nancial markets. Moreover, as expenditure on period 1 consumption
increases, this transformation curve shifts out radially. Similarly, as expenditure decreases the
curve contracts radially. And nally as more and more independent consumption pathways are
added the transformation curve closer and closer approximates a smooth transformation curve.10
For convenience, units are calibrated so that y1 = Au. In words, business-as-usual represents
the status quo pathway. Consequently,
m
 
y1

= m (Au) = p
>Au = 1: (8)
The alternative, q1; combines the business as usualand the climate-responsivepathways.
Thus,
q1   y1 = 'cAc + 'uAu; (9)
where 'c denotes the level at which pathway Ac is operated in q1 and 'u represents the change in
pathway Au involved in moving from y1 to q1.
Using (6), (8) and (9), the respective criteria are to adopt if:
SEU :
(1  ^B)u0 (AGu) ('cAGc + 'uAGu) + ^Bu0 (ABu) ('cABc + 'uABu)
u0 (w   1) > '
c + 'u;
MEU :
 
1  Hu0 (AGu) ('cAGc + 'uAGu) + Hu0 (ABu) ('cABc + 'uABu)
u0 (w   1) > '
c + 'u;
IEU :
 
1  Lu0 (AGu) ('cAGc + 'uAGu) + Lu0 (ABu) ('cABc + 'uABu)
u0 (w   1) > '
c + 'u:
10This of course manifests Houthhakkers famous demonstration that smooth isoquants can be closely approximated
by Leontief technologies.
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In writing the IEU criterion, we assume that
q1G   y1G = 'cAGc + 'uAGu < 0:
This ensures that q1 requires foregoing state G consumption relative to y1: The analysis extends to
a much broader class of policies, but this choice, which is maintained hereafter, focuses attention
on the type of choices of most current interest.
Figure 3 illustrates the decision environment. The ordered pairs of pathways or policy alter-
natives, ('u; 'c) ; on the negatively sloped 45o line emanating from the origin leave period 0 costs
unchanged. Pairs above it increase costs, and pairs below decrease them. Attention is restricted
to the policy pairs on or above the zero-net-cost line, so that q1 is at least as costly as y1: Again,
the model permits more general analysis, but the current pragmatic debate is about costly climate-
policy alternatives. Pairs satisfying
'cG + '
u = 0;
where G  AGc=AGu involve period 1 G state consumption remaining constant. These are illus-
trated by the negatively sloped ray emerging from the origin labelled G. By (7),
G < 1:
The cone dened by G and the 45o line, which delimits the alternative policies under consideration,
is referred to as the policy cone.11
Proposition 2 (1) If allocation (w  m (q1) ; q1) satises the IEU adoption criterion, then it also
satises the SEU and MEU criteria. If allocation (w  m (q1) ; q1) satises the SEU adoption
criterion, then it also satises theMEU criterion. (2) Any spreadof  (or increase in ambiguity),
which is represented by a change in beliefs from  to 0  ; makes it less likely for the IEU benet-
cost criterion for adoption to be met and more likely for the MEU benet-cost criterion to be met.
(3) In the case of complete ambiguity,  = [0; 1], the IEU benet-cost criterion for adoption is
never satised.
Proposition 2 reects the behavioral di¤erences inherent in the three preference structures. An
IEU decision maker, relative to the other decision makers, manifests a preference for the status
quo. This is an immediate consequence of her inability to compare all potential outcomes. Her
valuation of any move from Au is necessarily lower than that of either the MEU or SEU decision
maker. At the other extreme is theMEU decision maker. Her pessimism predisposes her to believe
that B is likely to occur. Thus, in evaluating gains and losses, she heavily discounts G state losses
11The general analysis, of course, applies to all policies in ('c; 'u) space. We leave it to the interested reader to
extend our arguments to other pairs.
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in favor of B state gains and nds Ac more attractive than the other decision makers. The two
forms of pessimism, one about changes from the status quo (IEU) and the other about the status
quo (MEU) clash. As a result, the objectively rational IEU decision maker will not adopt the
alternative policy in instances where the subjectively rational MEU decision maker would.
SEU and MEU decision makers are overly rational. They can rank all possible uncertain
alternatives. IEU decision makers are rational, but their ability to make comparisons is limited.
Consequently, their evaluation of future consumption streams is more guarded than those of either
an SEU or IEU decision maker.
When ambiguity is extreme, here approximated by setting  = [0; 1] ; the IEU criterion for
adoption is never satised. The objectively rational decision maker always stays put. The subjec-
tively rational MEU decision maker adopts if:
u0 (ABu) ('cABc + 'uABu)
u0 (w   1) > '
c + 'u:
Because u is strictly concave, there always exists a critical level of ABu satisfying this criterion.
Therefore, if Au involves a bad-enough outcome in state B; an MEU decision maker will always
adopt the alternative in the presence of extreme ambiguity because he or she places all of the
decision weight on that poor outcome.
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More generally, for a xed amount of ambiguity,
 
H   L ; the di¤erence between the MEU
and the IEU stochastically discounted marginal benets, 
H   L [u0 (ABu) ('cABc + 'uABu)  u0 (AGu) ('cAGc + 'uAGu)]
u0 (w   1) > 0;
measures the gap between the two decision criteria. It becomes arbitrarily large, ceteris paribus,
as ABu becomes arbitrarily small.12 Thus, subjectively rational and objectively rational benet-cost
criteria diverge the most precisely when the possible consequences of inaction (as captured by ABu)
are the largest.13
Figure 4, which combines Figures 1 and 2, illustrates Proposition 2. For visual clarity, linear u
is assumed. Point U represents Au: Point C represents Ac. Trapezoid OHUCI represents the set
of feasible activities for w   c0 = 1. In the illustrated case, both the SEU and MEU criteria for
adopting Ac are met. The IEU criterion is not:
An increase in ambiguity is visually represented by the IEU and MEU indi¤erence curves
becoming more kinked (closer to right angles). Complete ambiguity corresponds to the case where
12The reasoning here parallels that behind Weitzmans (2009). As ABu ! 0; the marginal utility loss associated
with the bad outcome becomes innitely large.
13Please see the Introduction for denitions of subjective and objective rationality.
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the kinks are right angles. Under complete ambiguity, an IEU decision maker will not adopt any
pathway that requires sacricing any consumption in state G: The MEU decision maker, on the
other hand, is willing to adopt any marginal change that increases consumption in state B:
An obvious question that arises in evaluating Proposition 2 is how it extends to a larger state
and action space. Without doubt enriching both complicates the analysis. The peculiar strength of
the discrete two-state case is its ability to cleanly sort outcomes into either goodor bad. When
there are more states, there are more potential outcomes, and this ability is necessarily diminished.
The key analytic question, however, is whether those outcomes can be rank ordered (as, for example,
in majorization analysis or in rank-dependent expected utility analysis). If they can, our results
should be relatively robust because the concavity of T () ensures that its superdi¤erentials are
cyclically monotone (Rockefellar 1970) which, in turn, guarantees a patterned manner in which to
assess outcomes. Models formulated in terms of random variables continuously distributed along
a nite or innite support on R, which segment into good tails and bad tails (for example,
Weitzman 2009, Pindyck 2012), impose that rank ordering by construction. Consequently, our
results should readily extend to that setting with relatively minor changes.
4 Application to climate change with numerical simula-
tions
We now turn to a quantitative analysis of the model. In common with much of the applied macro-
economics and nance literatures, the default specication for u in climate-change analyses is the
CRRA form
u (y) =
y1 n
1  n;
where n is the Pratt-Arrow coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. To ensure comparability of our
results, we also adopt that specication.
In climate-change analyses n plays two roles. One is to measure how individuals assess period
1 risks. Another emerges from the inequality-measurement literature (Atkinson, 1970). In that
context, n measures attitudes towards intertemporal consumption inequality (see, for example,
Dasgupta, 2007). Thus, the choice of n has proven controversial. In the risk literature, it is widely
believed that n should fall somewhere between 1 and 4: However, the macroeconomic literature
surrounding the equity premium paradox suggests it may be much higher. Rather than x it at
a single level, we vary it over the alternatives f1:5; 1:75; 2:00; 2:25; 2:50g ; which covers most of the
moderate alternatives in the climate-change literature (Nordhaus, 2008; Weitzman, 2007; Dasgupta,
2007). We also normalize the wealth level so that u0 (w   1) = 1: For this parametrization, the
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generic benet-cost criterion14 for adopting q1 is to adopt if
(1  B) (G'c + 'u)A1 nGu + B (B'c + 'u)A1 nBu

> 'c + 'u; (10)
where B  ABc=ABu; B = ^B for SEU , B = H for MEU , and B = L for IEU .
The time span between period 0 and period 1 is set at 100 years. This is in line with projections
from many IAMs, but about 100 years less than Weitzmans (2009) calculations. To accommodate
our discrete state space, the continuous range of temperature change15 is broken into two alterna-
tives. State B corresponds to a temperature increase that exceeds 50C. That size of increase can be
considered high but not extremely high. For example, IPCC AR5 (2013) reports that equilibrium
climate sensitivity is likely in the range of 1:5 to 4:5 C0 with high condence ... and very unlikely
greater than 60 with medium condence. State G corresponds to a temperature change with a
relatively small impact.
The current approach to incorporating uncertainty into many IAMs is to assign probability
distributions to key parameters, such as equilibrium climate-sensitivity, and then perform Monte
Carlo simulations (see, for example, Stern, 2007 and Pindyck, 2013). For example, USIWGSCC
(2010), recognizing the existence of varying estimated probability distributions (it reports 8), used
the Roe and Baker (2007) probability distribution calibrated for consistency with IPCC AR 4
(2007).16 Cruder approaches to consolidating di¤erent estimated probability distributions, such as
simple averaging, are also common (Weitzman, 2009; Pindyck, 2012).
A central problem in identifying a probability structure for climate sensitivity is that the actual
sensitivity of the real climate system is not directly measurable. E¤ort, therefore, has concentrated
on relating the standard climate-sensitivity measure to observable quantities. This can be achieved
either directly or through a model (IPCC AR4, 2007). The result is widespread variability across
studies in how empirical probability distributions are estimated.
Given such widespread ambiguity, our analysis questions the integrity of selecting a single prior
to evaluate uncertainty. Instead of a single prior, we rely on a range drawn from IPCC AR 5 (2013).
Using information available in Chapter 12 (especially Figures 12.8, 12.36, 12.37, and 12.40 and the
surrounding discussion), we set H = 0:12; L = 0:04; and ^B = 0:075:17
Economic studies of the damage due to climate change typically relate realized temperature
14By generic, we mean for an arbitrary  2 :
15Here, as elsewhere in the numerical illustration, we use the term temperature increasein the same sense that it
is used in the denition of climate sensitivity to denote the increase in global-mean temperature since pre-industrial
times.
16White House (2010) also considered three alternatives to the Roe and Baker (2007) distribution.
17AR5 projects that the globally averaged surface temperature will increase by 1:4C to 5:8C over the period
1990 to 2100 under the IPCC business as usual emissions scenario (see Table 1.1 in IPCC, 2013). These ndings are
consistent with a comparison of models that was conducted by the USGCRP (2009).
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change measured in degrees Centigrade, T; to GDP loss or consumption loss using a loss function
specication, D (T ) ; with D (0) = 1 (no damage) and D declining in T: Specications di¤er.
Nordhaus (2008), for example, uses an inverse quadratic specication, while Pindyck (2012) uses
an exponential loss function.18 We use Weitzmans (2012) reactive damage function:
D (T ) =
1
1 + (0:049T )2 + (0:16T )6:75
: (11)
D (T ) equals 0:78 for a 50C temperature increase.
The consumption pathways in A could be based upon scenarios from other climate-change stud-
ies. But, in practice, those scenarios are often highly speculative and, at best, only based on poorly
understood physical relationships that have even less understood large potential feedbacks. Thus,
to keep the analysis as simple and transparent as possible, we calibrate A. In the calibration, we
set G = 0:98 and B = 1:2: The parameters B and G represent the extent to which Ac attenuates
the dispersion in outcomes associated with Au. This attenuation e¤ect is important because it de-
termines the mutual insurance properties of Ac and Au: Roughly speaking, our calibration requires
that Ac avoids a loss of 20% of consumption if state B materializes at the cost of 2% of consumption
if state G materializes. Thus, the probability of B occurring that would make the expected value
of the implied attenuation e¤ect zero is approximately 11:5%.
The annual growth rate for AGu is set to 3%. This is consistent with global output projections
adjusted for population growth. The IMFs global growth projection for 2015 was around 3:8%
(IMF, 2014). UN (2004) estimates an average annual population growth rate of 0:77% for the period
2000 2050:However, that 3% is about 1% higher than the per-capita consumption growth rate used,
for example, in USIWGSCC (2010). For a 100-year time horizon, that choice yields AGu = 1:03100 =
19:22; and ABu = D (50C) AGu = :78 1:03100 = 14:99: The annual rate of time preference, denoted
by d; varies between 1:00 and 1:04: Hence,  varies in the range [1:00100; 1:04100] = [1:00; 50:51] :
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values.
Table 1. The values of model parameters.
18See also Dietz and Stern (2014) for a discussion and analysis based on various damage functions.
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Time horizon 100 years
Temperature Change, D (T ) T = 50C; D (T ) = :78
Average probability of B ^B = 0:075
Lower probability of B L = 0:04
Upper probability of B H = 0:12
Mitigation G = :98; B = 1:2
Degree of relative risk aversion n 2 f1:5; 1:75; 2:00; 2:25; 2:50g
Annual growth rate 3%
Annual rate of time preference d 2 [1:00; 1:04]
Suppose rst that the alternative policy simply replaces business as usual, Au; with Ac, that is,
q1 = Ac. For the parameter values in Table 1, the generic benet-cost criterion is to adopt if
(1  B) (0:98'c + 'u)  19:221 n + B (1:2'c + 'u)  14:991 n > ('c + 'u) d100: (12)
When q1 = Ac, some manipulation establishes
~B  :02  19:22
1 n
(2  14:991 n + :02  19:221 n) ;
as the lower bound for B requiring adoption. Calculated ~B ranges from a low of :06444 (n = 2:5)
to a high of :08115 (n = 1:5). For the tabulated values in Table 1, the IEU decision maker never
adopts Ac regardless of risk aversion. On the other hand, the MEU decision maker always adopts
Ac. The SEU decision maker, with ^B equal to .075, does not adopt for lower levels of risk aversion
(n = 1:5; 1:75), but does for higher levels of risk aversion. Whether the SEU decision maker adopts
or not depends critically upon where ^B is set. The closer ^B approaches L
 
H

, the closer the
SEU decision makers behavior approaches that of the IEU (MEU) decision maker.
For the more general case where q1 can represent a mixture of Au and Ac; the policy cone in our
calibration corresponds to ('c; 'u) satisfying (to six digits)
 1:020408  'u  'c   'u:
Taking n = 2 and d = 1:02 in (12) and performing the calculation results in the following adoption
criteria
'c <  1:000095  'u; MEU; (13)
'c <  1:000005  'u; SEU; and
'c <  0:999935  'u; IEU:
21
5n
5:pdf
For this parametrization, none of the policy alternatives in the policy cone satisfy the IEU criterion
for adoption. Some alternatives satisfy both the SEU and the MEU adoption criteria. Figure 5
illustrates. The ('c; 'u) alternatives satisfying the SEU criterion fall in the cone between the rays
OA and OB. And the set satisfying the MEU criterion is given by the cone between OA and OC:
Both are proper subsets of the policy cone.
The parameter 'u measures the change in the level at which Au is used under the new policy
alternative. As a practical matter, most climate-change policy discussions involve moving away
from Au to Ac. Thus, 'u is expected to be negative. The IEU adoption criterion is met in this case
only if the increase in 'c less than matches the decline in 'u: The objectively rational IEU decision
maker only adopts moves towards Ac that reduce period 0 costs! He or she needs to be compensated
for decreased period 1 consumption in state G by increased current period consumption. Future
sacrice only comes if there is a clear myopic benet. Both the SEU and the MEU; on the other
hand, are willing to trade some increase in current period cost for the benet associated with the
alternative. But, as our conceptual results imply, the SEU decision maker is willing to absorb a
smaller current cost burden than the MEU decision maker.
For each decision maker, there are two e¤ects involved. One is the pure income e¤ect of moving
from Ac towards Au: At the margin, MEU evaluates the expectation of that income e¤ect to be
positive (:021488 in undiscounted terms). Both the SEU and the IEU decision makers evaluate its
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expectation to be negative ( :13702 and  :249104, respectively). The second e¤ect is the insurance
e¤ect associated with moving towards the less dispersed Ac: For all decision makers, this is positive.
The MEU decision maker, with a positive income e¤ect and a positive insurance e¤ect, adopts.
For SEU , the insurance e¤ect, in this case, is positive enough to counteract the negative income
e¤ect for small enough moves in the direction of Ac: For IEU , it is not. The di¤erence in each case
reduces to which probability each decision maker uses to evaluate both the income e¤ect and the
risk e¤ect.
Table 2 summarizes our general adoption results that are obtained by varying n and d. Each
cell reports the benet-cost criteria that satisfy inequality (13) for some ('u; 'c) combinations in
the policy cone. The fractions reported in parentheses represent the percentage of the policy cone
that satises (13), as dened by the ratio
((1  B) 19:221 n + B14:991 n   d100)
(0:98 (1  B) 19:221 n + 1:2B14:991 n   d100)   1

=

1
G
  1

;
for each of the respective B: So, for example, when n = 2:0 and d = 1:0; the IEU benet-cost
criterion is never satised in the policy cone. The SEU criterion is satised for :197% of the policy
cone, and the MEU criterion is satised for 3:552% of the policy alternatives.
A particularly stark result emerges from Table 2. The IEU criterion is never met for any
parameter values in the policy cone, but the MEU criterion is always satised for some alternatives
in the policy cone. So, an MEU decision maker is always willing to accept some costly policy
alternatives in this calibration of our model, but an IEU one never will.19 An SEU decision maker
who is relatively risk tolerant (n = 1:5 and n = 1:75) will never accept any alternative in the policy
cone, while an SEU decision maker who is relatively risk averse (n = 2:00; n = 2:25; and n = 2:5)
will accept some alternatives in the policy cone. However, for ^B = :075; the percentage of the
policy cone meeting the SEU criterion is quite small (compared toMEU) and never exceeds :25%.
Table 2. Benet-cost Adoption Criteria Satisfaction
19There are no parameterizations in our grid for which either MEU or SEU criteria are satised for all points in
the policy cone.
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n = 1:5 n = 1:75 n = 2:00 n = 2:25 n = 2:5
d = 1:00 MEU (0:1397) MEU (0:0681)
MEU (0:03552)
SEU (0:00197)
MEU (0:01894)
SEU (0:00246)
MEU (0:01016)
SEU (0:00193)
d = 1:01 MEU (0:0433) MEU (0:0233)
MEU (0:01267)
SEU (0:00070)
MEU (0:00688)
SEU (0:00089)
MEU (0:00373)
SEU (0:00071)
d = 1:02 MEU (0:0153) MEU (0:0085)
MEU (0:00467)
SEU (0:00026)
MEU (0:00255)
SEU (0:00033)
MEU (0:00139)
SEU (0:00026)
d = 1:03 MEU (0:0056) MEU (0:0032)
MEU (0:00175)
SEU (0:00010)
MEU (0:00096)
SEU (0:00012)
MEU (0:00052)
SEU (0:00010)
d = 1:04 MEU (0:0021) MEU (0:0012)
MEU (0:00067)
SEU (0:00004)
MEU (0:00037)
SEU (0:00005)
MEU (0:00020)
SEU (0:00004)
Not surprisingly, the percentage of alternatives judged acceptable by either MEU or SEU
declines as d rises. This behavior reects the decision makers increasing unwillingness to trade
todays consumption for future consumption gains associated with increasing d: On the other hand,
SEU and MEU acceptance behavior react di¤erently qualitatively to changing n. For MEU ,
as risk aversion increases, holding d constant, the percentage of policy alternatives satisfying the
adoption criteria declines. For the SEU decision maker, the percentage increases, peaking in each
instance (albeit at very small levels) at n = 2:5 and then decreasing.
4.1 Sensitivity analysis
The relative attractiveness of Ac as an alternative to Au naturally depends upon how it attenuates
the latters outcome variability. This attenuation is captured parametrically by B and G: Increas-
ing B provides additional protection against B relative to Au: Decreasing G increases the period
1 cost of implementing Ac if G occurs. Simultaneously increasing B and decreasing G trades
decreased returns in G for additional protection against B: For example, if B is increased and G
is decreased by the same di¤erentially small amount (" > 0), the marginal change in the generic
benet-cost adoption criterion is
'c


BA
1 n
Bu   (1  B)A1 nGu

";
which is increasing in B. Consequently, the MEU decision maker would perceive such a change
as being more attractive than either the SEU or the IEU decision makers.
To investigate these e¤ects, set B = 1:15 which corresponds to Ac avoiding a loss of 15% of
consumption if state B materializes (in contrast to 20% in our calculations above). Ceteris paribus,
this makes activity Ac less attractive for all decision makers. Setting n = 2:00; d = 1:02; and
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G = 0:98; results in the following respective benet-cost criteria:
'c <  1:000040  'u; MEU; (14)
'c <  0:999971  'u; SEU; and
'c <  0:999917  'u; IEU:
The MEU criterion is satised for some alternatives in the policy cone, both the SEU and IEU
criteria are never satised. Thus, changing B from 1:2 to 1:15 qualitatively changes the SEU
decision makers behavior. While some alternatives in the policy cone are attractive for B = 1:2;
Au is always the preferred option under B = 1:15:
Increasing the attractiveness of activity Ac; by changing B from 1:20 to 1:25; does not lead
to qualitative changes in decision makers behavior. Setting B = 1:25, n = 2:00; d = 1:02; and
G = 0:98; the respective benet-cost criteria become
'c <  1:000151  'u; MEU; (15)
'c <  1:000040  'u; SEU; and
'c <  0:999954  'u; IEU:
The MEU and SEU criteria are satised for some alternatives in the policy cone while the IEU
criterion is never satised.
We also ran two additional simulations for parameter G : G = 0:97 and G = 0:99: The
rst increases the period 1 cost of activity Ac if G occurs, and the second decreases it. The
other parameters were set at n = 2:00; d = 1:02; and B = 1:2: The SEU criterion is satised
for some alternatives in the policy cone under G = 0:98 but never satised for G = 0:97: The
MEU criterion is satised for some alternatives in the policy cone while the IEU criterion is never
satised when G = 0:97: When G is set to 0:99; implying that the alternative to Ac only incurs
a 1% loss if G eventuates, the IEU decision makers benet-cost adoption criterion is satised for
some alternatives in the policy cone: As one would expect, the MEU and SEU criteria are also
met for some alternatives in the policy cone under this scenario. Thus, if costs associated with the
alternative activity are su¢ ciently small, the alternative can prove attractive to all decision makers.
In truth, little to nothing is known about the true form of D (T ). Faced with this ignorance,
modelers have treated specication selection for D (T ) more as a matter of analytic convenience
than hard science. For example, Pindyck (2013, p.867) writes: When it comes to the damage
function, however, we know almost nothing, so developers of IAMs can do little more than make
up functional forms and corresponding parameter values. And that is pretty much what they have
done.Similarly, a reviewer has reacted to our setting D (T ) to 0:78 for a 50C temperature increase
with disbelief noting that many scientists think such a temperature increase may be civilization-
ending.
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To investigate how the choice of D (T ) may a¤ect decision criteria, we set n = 2:00 and d = 1:02
and then calculate the level ofD (T ) that would convince an IEU decision maker to move away from
Au toward the alternative: The resulting value is D (T ) = :42; which implies a 58% consumption
loss if the bad state eventuates (the temperature change is 50 C), and is substantially smaller than
the value in Table 1, which implies a 22% loss. In other words, damages have to be approximately
2.5 times as large as those implied by Table 1 before adoption occurs. It is hard to call such a
loss anything other than truly catastrophic. It is important to note that this calculation, which
uses L; e¤ectively sets the relevant subjective probability at approximately 4%; which is orders of
magnitude higher than current scientic predictions about catastrophic outcomes. If L is set to
:01; which is still extremely high for a truly catastrophic loss, the IEU decision maker would only
abandon Au if D (T ) < 0:1. Losses in state B would have to exceed 90% relative to state G:
5 Concluding Remarks
The model is intentionally simplied. And while the goal is not practical policy advice, such advice
is important, and many economists want to provide it. The key issue confronting economists is
whether policy to control greenhouse gases should be immediately stringent or increase abatement
gradually. Our results show that the policy advice o¤ered depends crucially upon the normative
framework.
Regardless of risk attitudes and concern about future generations, the objectively rational IEU
framework suggests caution in adopting policies to mitigate the e¤ects of climate change, the sub-
jectively rational MEU framework is far more proactive. The SEU framework falls between those
poles. Whether it supports either immediate stringency or gradualism depends crucially, as is
already well-known, upon risk attitudes and concerns about future generations.
A crucial point to understand is that the perceived gap between the IEU and MEU recom-
mendations is in an important sense science-based. It results from the lack of agreement among
professional scientists on the likelihood of the degree of climate change. To be objectively rational
in the sense of Gilboa et al. (2010), a policy recommendation in our setting needs to satisfy the
IEU criterion, which boils down to requiring unanimity across di¤erent probability structures. Be-
cause there is such widespread disagreement in the scientic community, the objectively rational
suggestion is e¤ectively wait and see. Subjective rationality, on the other hand, in this setting es-
sentially requires that the decision maker adhere to the one-percent doctrine, famously attributed
to Dick Cheney: if there is even a small chance of a catastrophic outcome, it should be treated as
though it were a near certainty.
That leaves us on familiar ground. Sterns (2007) IAM-based analysis advocated immediate
and drastic policy action. This contrasted dramatically with other IAM-based studies that had
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concluded a more gradual approach was appropriate. Sterns (2007) results were quickly traced to
what were argued to be extremechoices for  and the curvature of u:Multiple authors classed these
as ethical choicesand criticized them on that basis. Weitzman (2007, 2009), while criticizing Stern
(2007) on similar grounds, noted that support for some of Sterns (2007) recommendations might
be found in his dismal theorem, which e¤ectively buttresses the one-percent doctrine. Even
more recently, Pindyck (2013) has written that IAM-based analysis has created ...a perception
of knowledge and precision, but that perception is illusory and misleading.Our results reinforce
Pindycks (2013) criticism by showing that changes in normative assumptions profoundly change
policy suggestions. In other words, economic-policy suggestions hinge crucially upon ethical choices.
That nding emphasizes that, in another sense, the gap between the objectively rational IEU
and the subjectively rational MEU is not science based. Rather it emerges from di¤erent, and
fundamentally normative (ethical), assumptions about what characterizes rational behavior for a
decision maker. The same is true for SEU: It rests on a distinct viewpoint as to what is rational be-
havior. Because those viewpoints di¤er and those di¤erences turn out to have deep implications for
policy recommendations, it is hard to accept any of those recommendations (be it from IEU; MEU;
or SEU) as truly science-based. Instead, following Gilboa (2009), they are perhaps more properly
recognized as rhetorical devices marshalled by economists to support di¤erent policy positions
We carry no brief for any of the approaches. Our intent is not to criticize the independence axiom
or any of the alternatives as decision rules. That has been done elsewhere (see, for example, Al-
Najjar, 2013).20 Rather, in an atmosphere where the SEU criteria seem to have been uncritically
accepted, our goal is to identify what happens if alternatives are considered. Thus, borrowing
Weitzmans phrasing, we envision the analysis here as investigating what ..the discipline-imposing
form of ... IEU(MEU) ... might o¤er by way of guidance for coherently thinking about ...
climate change. When contrasted with SEU , they o¤er radically di¤erent recommendations.
There obviously remain shortcomings. One is that only two alternatives to SEU have been
considered. Smooth ambiguity models, in particular, have proved popular in climate-change
analyses (see, for example, Lange and Treich (2008) and Millner et al. (2013)). One clear reason for
their popularity is that they permit analysis using standard calculus-based manipulation rather than
requiring the use of super and sub di¤erentials. The smooth ambiguity model, as does SEU; falls
betweenthe MEU and IEU preference structures. Unlike SEU; however, the smooth ambiguity
20There also exists a burgeoning experimental literature that elicits perceptions and attitudes to ambiguity.
Camerer and Wember (1992) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) provide an early and recent reviews of
this literature, respectively. A plethora of studies nds that decision-makers are sensitive to ambiguity and attitudes
to ambiguity vary considerably over decision-makers and choice environments. Based on a rather exhaustive review
of the literature, Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) conclude that ambiguity aversion is most widespread in the
domain of moderate-likelihood gains while ambiguity seeking is typical in the domains of low likelihoods or losses.
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model is structured to permit discrimination within its parametrization between ambiguity aversion
and risk aversion. But, as Epstein (1999) shows, that requires postulating a notion of ambiguity
neutralityand then measuring ambiguity aversion relative to that norm,21 and that requires yet
another ethical judgment. At one extreme of the smooth ambiguity model is a completely ambiguity-
averse decision maker withMEU preferences. At the other extreme is the decision maker with IEU
preferences. Thus, our results can be used to illuminate the scope of policy prescriptions for di¤erent
parameterizations of the smooth ambiguity model.
Another, closely related, challenge is illustrated by our generic benet-cost criterion. Any of
the reported results can be rationalized in a Bayesian SEU framework by an appropriate choice
of priors over : This is well-known, and is true of any smooth ambiguity model or multiple-
prior representation. For example, our numerical IEU results can be rationalized in a Bayesian
framework by specifying a degenerate prior over  that placed all the weight on L: Similarly, the
MEU numerical results can be rationalized by a Bayesian prior that placed all the weight on H :
Thus, one could explain any of our results by a proper choice of priors. But that is not how they
were derived. Rather they were derived by considering alternatives to axioms that are fundamental
to SEU modelling and then considering the alternative in the same decision setting as faced by
the SEU decision maker. The MEU thinkers are not modeled as hysterics. They are rational
individuals whose preferences satisfy a weakened version of the SEU axioms. Similarly, IEU
thinkers are not modeled as myopic. Rather, they are rational but realize that they may not be
able to compare everything. And in an applied policy setting where the choice of utility structures,
damage functions, and probability distributions by highly trained economists is routinely driven by
computational tractability and not reality, that type of rationality is not without its own appeal.
Note also that the choice of a prior over  to rationalize policy prescriptions in a Bayesian SEU
framework will be a function of the proposed policy (or, in decision-theoretic terms, act). This is
illustrated very e¤ectively by the two-color Ellsberg experiment. Consider a bet on an ambiguous
urn with black and white balls in unknown proportions. A decision maker with MEU preferences
will rely on the lowest possible likelihood of drawing a black ball when betting on black and will
rely on the lowest possible likelihood of drawing a white ball when betting on white. Since these
two probability distributions are di¤erent for an MEU decision maker, the latter corresponds to
a di¤erent SEU decision maker on each of the two choice occasions. Thus, in general, one cannot
pick a rightSEU decision maker with unique rightbeliefs to model an MEU decision-maker.
This discussion brings us to another important point. Any suitably smooth (super or sub
di¤erentiably smooth that is) welfare structure can be approximated by a local expected utility
function in the sense of Machina (1982) or a local probability transformation in the sense of Quig-
21This point, as Epstein (1999) emphasizes, echoes Yaaris (1969) earlier demonstration that risk aversion is
fundamentally a comparative notion requiring comparing more risk aversebehavior to risk-neutralbehavior.
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gin and Chambers (2003). The latter implies that any suitably smooth structure can be locally
approximated by local risk-neutral probabilitiesof the type encountered in the nance literature.
Operationally, these risk-neutral probabilitiesare dened by the superdi¤erentials of T (q; y) in q1:
Thus, welfare comparisons can be supported by an appropriate choice of risk-neutral probabilities
and thus reduce to risk-neutral benet-cost analyses. That implies that the exercise of cost-benet
analysis under SEU degenerates to choosing the appropriate risk-neutral probabilitiesto assess
benets and costs. In other words, a general representation of T (q; y) can be used to do cost-benet
analysis in terms of these risk-neutral probabilities. Its only a slight exaggeration to say from
this perspective that much of the controversy about climate-change policy degenerates to a single
point. One side, those in favor of immediate action, believes those risk-neutral probabilities should
be set near one and the other, those in favor of delay, believes they should be set to zero. Our
analysis illustrates this deeper point in a more structured way by using familiar parametrization to
show how crucially scienticeconomic results depend upon that axiomatic setting and are not
robust to its relaxation.
We envision a number of avenues for future research. The present model does not treat learning
opportunities, technological change, or other dynamic considerations. Exploring how such factors
interact with ambiguity in di¤erent decision paradigms is crucial to determining practical policy
advice. Another noteworthy direction involves an examination of climate-change policies in a frame-
work with mulitple decision-makers (representing, for example, di¤erent countries) di¤erentiated by
perceptions and attitudes to ambiguity. A more rened quantitative analysis of these extensions
of the present model, with a more detailed modeling of the physical processes governing climate
change and the associated ambiguity, could yield new and important insights.
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6 Appendix: Derivation of (6)
Using (2) and (5), we obtain
T oSEU
 
y; y;m
 
y1
 m  q1 ; q1   y1
= lim
#0
2664w  m (y
1) +  (m (y1) m (q1))  u 1

u (w  m (y1)) 
PS
s=1 ^s(u(y1s+(q1s y1s)) u(y1s))



3775
=
 
m
 
y1
 m  q1+ lim
#0
2664w  m (y
1)  u 1

u (w  m (y1)) 
PS
s=1 ^s(u(y1s+(q1s y1s)) u(y1s))



3775
=
 
m
 
y1
 m  q1+ lim
#0

M ()


;
where
M ()  w  m  y1  u 1 "u  w  m  y1  1

SX
s=1
^s
 
u
 
y1s + 
 
q1s   y1s
  u  y1s
#
:
It follows from the preceding expression that

u
 
w  m  y1  u w  m  y1 M () = 1

SX
s=1
^s
 
u
 
y1s + 
 
q1s   y1s
  u  y1s :
Dividing by  and taking limits on both sides, we obtain
u0
 
w  m  y1 lim
#0
M ()

=
1

SX
s=1
^su
0  y1s  q1s   y1s :
Hence,
T oSEU
 
y; y;m
 
y1
 m  q1 ; q1   y1 = PSs=1 ^su0 (y1s) (q1s   y1s)
u0 (w  m (y1)) +
 
m
 
y1
 m  q1 :
The directional derivatives for MEU and IEU preferences can be obtained similarly.
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